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February 01, 2016

Transcript: NTSB's second interview with engineer of Amtrak 188

Brandon Bostian talks about what he remembers from the night of the deadly derailment

Amtrak 188 Crash NTSB
05142015_brandon_Bostian2_LinkedIn Source/Brandon Bostian/LinkedIn

Brandon Bostian, who was operating the Amtrak train that derailed in Philadelphia on May 12, 2015, will not be charged by the city district attorney.

The National Transportation Safety Board on Monday released its investigative docket of the Amtrak 188 crash in Philadelphia in May 2015. A final report is due in the spring.

One of the central questions in the investigation into the accident that killed eight and injured 200 is why did the train speed through the curve at Frankford Junction at twice the posted limit.

Only the engineer of that train, Brandon Bostian, 32, knows but he has told investigators that he hit his head in the accident and doesn't remember anything after ringing the train's bell as he passed through the North Philadelphia station about three miles before the curve.

What follows is the transcript of the second NTSB interview with Bostian on November 10, 2015:

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NTSB Accident No. DCA15MR010



Tuesday, November 10, 2015

NTSB Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

•  •  •


(10:30 a.m.)

MR. JENNER: Good morning. My name is Stephen Jenner and I'm an Investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. Today is November 10, 2015. It is 10:30 a.m. We are on the fourth floor conference room at the NTSB headquarters in Washington, D.C. We are to talk with Mr. Bostian, a Locomotive Engineer, about the Amtrak accident in Philadelphia on May 12, 2015. The accident number is DCA15MR010. This is the second time we're talking to Mr. Bostian.

The purpose of the interview is to see if he has any additional information he can provide us today that may help with our investigation of this accident. And perhaps, offer some thoughts about making the industry safer.

Let me go around the room and have everyone introduce themselves. Please spell your last name and state who you are with. Again, my name is Stephen Jenner, S-T-E-P-H-E-N J-E-N-N-E-R. I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB. And continuing on my left.

MS. MCKAY: This is Mary 25 Pat McKay, M-C-K-A-Y, and I'm the Chief Medical Officer for the NTSB.

MR. BUCHER: Dave Bucher, B-U-C-H-E-R and I'm Rail Accident Investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board Operations Specialist.

MR. BOSTIAN: I should say my name?


MR. BOSTIAN: I am Brandon Bostian, B-O-S-T-I-A-N.

MR. GOGGIN: I'm Robert Goggin, G-O-G-G-I-N, Counsel for Mr. Bostian.


MR. JENNER: Great, thank you. Again, we really appreciate you being here and giving us an opportunity to talk to you a second time. So if you don't have any questions for us, we'll just jump right into it. What we learned, you know, since talking to you is that this incident occurred about eight miles from the Amtrak 30th Street Station and it took about 11, 12 minutes before the train reached the accident curve.

During the first interview, you indicated that you didn't have memory of many details after passing the North Philadelphia Station. So I'll just open it up. If you want to talk about anything you may have remembered before passing the North Philly Station and if you have any memories after passing North Philly Station.

MR. BOSTIAN: I'm not sure that I remember anything significant before passing North Philadelphia Station. I guess what happened before then was, I passed the, set the train on the adjacent track that had gone -- the engineer had placed that train into emergency. He had reported that rocks had hit his windshield. He had had a radio conversation with the dispatcher. The dispatcher asked him a couple of times if he needed medical attention. He didn't answer the question directly and so, they went back and forth a few times.

I radioed that SEPTA train to alert them that I was passing on an adjacent track. And then I blew my train's whistle quite a bit. And I think that I was concerned, with all the confusion on the radio, that they may have personnel on the ground inspecting their train and that they may not be completely situationally aware at that time. So I blew my whistle probably more than I would have had they acknowledged my radio transmission that I was approaching on an adjacent track. And that was before passing North Philadelphia.

After I passed North Philadelphia, my memory isn't completely clear. There's several gaps in my memory as I approached the accident curve. And I couldn't say with certainty that my memory is accurate. There are a couple of prominent scenes in my head that have come back to me since we last spoke.

The first one, after North Philadelphia, there are a few speed changes. One of the significant speed changes is there's a 65 mile an hour curve that leads into an 80 mile an hour straightaway that leads into a 50 mile an hour curve, I think, at Frankford Junction or around Frankford Junction area.

The memory I think I may have from that night was that I came out of the 65 mile an hour curve. I pushed the throttle forward to accelerate my train. And as I approached 70 miles an hour, I have a memory that I backed off the throttle by mistake because I was targeting 70 miles an hour instead of 80 miles an hour.

And as I approached 70 miles an hour, I have a memory that I took action to bring the train up to 70 miles an hour. And I have a memory that I realized my mistake, that I should have been operating at 80 miles an hour. And that I pushed the throttle forward in order to accelerate from 70 to 80.

And I don't remember anything from that point until after the train was already in the curve.

And again, with that memory of bringing the train to 70, realizing a mistake and then making an attempt to bring the train from 70 to 80. There's a very good possibility that could have occurred on a previous trip because that sort of mistake is something that could have happened on any trip.

So I don't know. I can't tell you with accuracy, with certainty that that was on the night of the accident. But in my mind, that's what I believe. That's when I believe that memory was from.

As I said, once I pushed the throttle forward in an attempt to bring the train up to 80 miles an hour, I don't have any other memories until after the train was already in the curve. And the memory that happened from that point was, the memory from there is very vague. The only word, and I hesitate to use the word dream-like because it sounds like I was asleep and I don't believe that I was asleep at all. But kind of a very foggy memory as in I don't have, the memory doesn't includes much visual memory. I don't remember hearing much.

It was more of a feeling. I remember feeling my body lurch to the right, towards the right side of the engine. I remember feeling as though I was going too fast around a curve. In response to that feeling, I put the train brake on, made about a ten pound application of the brake.

On a normal operating day, that would be my normal response to slowing down the train for a normal speed reduction. Would be to put a ten pound application of the brake on, give it about maybe five or ten seconds for the brakes to apply. And then apply the brakes further to make a smooth brake application for comfortable train handling.

Very soon -- this again, I don't know if this memory is accurate. But my memory is, very quickly after I made that ten pound reduction, I realized from the force on my body, I realized that this is something that's very serious and I need to bring down the train speed quickly.

And so, almost immediately after I made that ten pound reduction, I went to full service on the brakes which would be, you know, I need to slow down this train quickly, right now. At some point after I made that reduction of the brake, from my memory, I felt a sensation of the fireman's side of the locomotive lifting up.

In other words, the train felt, the engine felt as though it were tilting over. But I remember taking a few seconds -- I say seconds, I don't mean that literally. I don't know how long it physically took me to realize. But it felt like it took some amount of time for me to realize the sensation, put together that the sensation of the fireman's side of the engine tilting up really meant that the train engine was tilting over.

And that's when I realized that it wasn't that the train was going somewhat fast around the curve. The train was going significantly fast around the curve. And that's when I put the train into emergency. And so the memory I have that may or may not be accurate -- like I said, I can't vouch for how accurate the memory is.

But my memory was, my memory is of making three manipulations of the brake control. That first one of going to a ten pound reduction. And then realizing almost immediately that it was a more serious situation and going directly to full service. And then when I realized that the train engine was tipping over, I put the train into emergency.

About the same time I put the train into emergency, I recall hoping that the train would not tip completely over. And at the same time, I remember being fearful that even if the train didn't tip over, if it remained somewhat on the track -- I was hoping that the train would fall back down onto the track because it lost speed.

And my concern was that there was the next curve coming up, the right hand curve. My concern was even if it fell down onto the track, I didn't know if it was going to fall completely onto the track or if it was going to come back onto the rail and derail somewhat. And I didn't know if it was going to make it around the next curve.

Those are the thoughts I remember having and the moment where I felt the sensation of the train tipping over. Immediately after having those thoughts, I remember feeling the train tip over even further. And I remember realizing that the train was going to go off the track.

I remember holding onto the controls tightly and feeling like, okay well this is it, I'm going over. And so I tried to brace myself. The only visual memory I have from that sequence of events is I remember seeing objects fly in front of me, kind of a bluish tint to them. I thought it was paperwork or some sort of thing, objects in the cab. I wasn't sure what it was.

When I try to remember what the visual of the memory is, it just looks like small objects. And that's pretty much all I remember. The next memory I have is, like I said before I think, of coming to after the event was over in the cab.

I don't have a clear memory of what position I was in when I came to after the event was over. I have a memory of standing up in the cab. And by that, I mean I have a memory of me standing. I don't have a memory of getting up or the action of standing up. I have a memory of me standing up in the cab.

I have a memory of looking out. I have a memory of opening the fireman's side door I think. I have a memory of looking, of standing in the doorway and looking back at where the train was. Hearing screams from passengers and otherwise kind of quiet.

And then I have a memory of walking through brush from the engine towards where I heard passengers and turning on my phone. I pushed the power button on my phone at some point. It was powering on while I was walking through brush. And then, I think at some point between the engine and the passenger car that was close by -- the passenger car I walked towards is the one that had the roof that was buckled and open to sky.

At some point between the engine and that car, the phone completely powered on. I stopped and I turned off airplane mode. I've always been paranoid about getting caught with my cell phone on. So my habit has always been to, it's part of my checklist before I move an engine. At the initial terminal, I put my ringtone volume on silent and I put my airplane mode in airplane mode. And then I completely power off the phone and I put it in my (inaudible).

And so, halfway between the engine and the passenger car, once the phone booted up, I turned off airplane mode and then I kept walking. And then I called 911 as I got close to the car. A passenger saw me using my phone to call 911 -- and I'll back up.

When I was on 911, I didn't know what my location was. I do have a memory of not knowing. Once I had dialed 911 and hit send on the phone, I remember thinking, oh my gosh I have no idea where I am, this is going to be, I'm not going to be able to tell them where I am. The most I'm going to be able to tell them is that maybe my train number and the fact that a train had derailed. But I guess that's better than nothing.

But it was a relief when I called 911 and they said that they had already gotten the report. I remember looking up and I saw an overhead bridge of like industrial, I don't know if you'd call it piping or something. It wasn't a public roadway or a public walkway I don't think.

But I saw that and that looked familiar but I couldn't for the life of me tell you. I had seen that before. I knew that I had seen that but I couldn't tell you where I was. And it took me several minutes to remember that it was somewhere near Philadelphia. And then it took me along time after that to remember exactly where that curve was.

And ready to go back, after I got off the phone with 911, a passenger that I had reached -- therewas a group of three passengers. One of the passengers asked to borrow my phone to call somebody and I let her borrow my phone. I thought she made a quick conversation, or made a quick call to somebody.

A month or so later at my house, I looked over, I got a copy of my cell phone bill. It turned out that that phone call she made, I guess was about seven minutes long. In my mind, I thought it was 30 seconds. Soon after that, soon after her call, I saw first responders come over the track.

It looked like the track, they came over a hill, it looked like the track was on a hill. I waved my flashlight at him. I had my flashlight in my pocket, I used it to walk from the engine to the car.

I remember seeing my flashlight along the brush as I walked over. I used my flashlight to wave at the first responders and a few of them came over to help the three passengers that I was standing next to.

I asked them, you know, what I could do to help. I said that I didn't feel like I was hurt or anything. And they just told me to sit down where I was and I sat down. And eventually, someone else told me to get up and walk over there to the, walk across the tracks to the triage area. And I walked across the tracks to the triage area.

I think those are pretty much the details that I didn't have a good memory of last time we talked. Maybe the only other stuff that's come up is I remember hearing, while I was in triage area, I remember hearing some of the first responders shouting to each other watch out, the electricity hasn't been turned off yet.

I remember feeling terrible that that's something that I didn't warn them about either. That I should have known that myself, that I didn't do anything to try to protect the response crews or radio for help or do anything.

I know that, looking back on it, it's kind of ridiculous. I was in a bad situation myself but at the time, I remember feeling just beside myself that I didn't do any of the normal radio calls or anything. I don't remember getting on the radio after the accident or anything, making an emergency call or anything.

After that, you know, I went to the ER, all that. I think we pretty well, probably covered that last time. So yes, I think that's what I remember.

MR. JENNER: Great. I appreciate that.

There are two areas that I heard that you gave a wonderful description. I just want to go back --

MR. BOSTIAN: Yes, sure.

MR. JENNER: -- and explore some more details. One thing that you just mentioned and I don't think you talked in as much detail the first time, was you blowing your whistle as you were passing the SEPTA train. And you had, there was some confusion about what was going on out there at that time.


MR. JENNER: I don't think you commented that on the --


MR. JENNER: -- on the first interview. So if I understood what you just said, the confusion, you know, or uncertainty was what is going on with the SEPTA train at that moment.

MR. BOSTIAN: Well the confusion that I remember having when I was passing by them was, we have the standard procedure that you're supposed to follow when your train goes into emergency. Is that you're supposed to, immediately the train crew is supposed to get out and provide protection for trains on adjacent tracks until you're relieved of that duty by the dispatcher.

And also, before you start moving again, your train crew is supposed to inspect the train to make sure all wheels are on the track. And so, when I heard the confusion going on between the dispatcher and the engineer of that train, I was concerned that there was a possibility that there may have been some sort of communication breakdown onboard the train itself between the engineer and the conductor and the assistant train men, or the assistant conductor, the various train men.

And maybe there was a possibility that some of the train men may have decided on their own to get off the equipment to either provide protection or to start inspecting the train without the knowledge of the engineer or the conductor or the dispatcher. And so that's why I wanted to make sure that there was some sort of whistling, that I was providing whistle.

And then also, I think that there was a train coming the opposite direction, if I remember right. I remember seeing headlights coming the other way. So I wanted to make sure -- and it probably wasn't the appropriate response. But I wanted to make sure that I whistled as well so that, if the other train was whistling, so they knew that there were two trains coming from opposite directions.

Because it seemed like that was a scenario where it would be really easy for someone to get struck by a train, out in the middle of the night with a lot of radio confusion going on. So that's why I made as much noise as I possibly could. But there's a possibility that, in that situation, the extra whistling could have added to the confusion.

MR. JENNER: Okay. If you recall, and I think you may have mentioned --


MR. JENNER: -- moments ago. Before you passed the SEPTA train, you got on the radio and said you're hot on two.


MR. JENNER: But you did not get a reply from SEPTA.

MR. BOSTIAN: That's right.

MR. JENNER: Would you have expected to have gotten a reply?

MR. BOSTIAN: I would have hoped for one. I think, I wasn't surprised that I didn't get a reply. But I think if things had been less chaotic between the potential medical emergency and everything -- I think if we were out in the middle of nowhere and, you know, there had been an event and things had calmed down, I think it would have been standard. If they had heard me say that, they would have replied probably with a thank you or something. But as confusing as things were, I'm not really surprised, if that makes sense.

MR. JENNER: Okay. And when you passed the SEPTA train, did you end up seeing anyone on the ground?

MR. BOSTIAN: I didn't but I think that there was an oncoming train with headlights. And it was hard to see anything with all the headlights or with the glare from the headlights. So if there was somebody on the ground, I wouldn't have seen them.

MR. JENNER: Okay. And so you traveled on in the second area that you just provided more details. And you opened up by saying, there's changes in, I guess maximum authorized speed, 65 to 80. Now I heard you saying you may have mistaken 70 for 80.


MR. JENNER: I know you gave a lot of good details right there.


MR. JENNER: But for a moment you thought the maximum speed was 70?

MR. BOSTIAN: I had a, I wouldn't say I thought the maximum authorized speed was 70. But you know, any time you're operating a car or a vehicle, sometimes in your head, you might be targeting 80. But you notice the needle approaches a whole number like 70 --

MR. JENNER: Right.

MR. BOSTIAN: -- or whatever, you may just kind of peg on that 70 and see the needle approach 70.Or even the digits, I usually look at the digits. So I might look at, you know, 68, 69, 70 and just kind of get the wires crossed for lack of a better world, and accidentally, you know, hone in on the wrong speed.

MR. JENNER: Right.

MR. BOSTIAN: Makes sense?

MR. JENNER: But in a sense, you erred on the safer side.


MR. JENNER: It was actually you could have gone up to 80.

MR. BOSTIAN: I could have gone 80.

MR. JENNER: But you were targeting 70?

MR. BOSTIAN: And I wouldn't say it was especially a conscious decision.

MR. JENNER: Right.

MR. BOSTIAN: More of a subconscious thing, you know.


MR. BOSTIAN: Where you know, you're trying to go for a particular speed and you see the last digit getting close to, you know, eight, nine, zero and you start backing off.


MR. BOSTIAN: Also there's, for other types of trains the speed limit is 70. So there's a possibility I may have gotten momentarily mixed up.

Not that I thought I was on that type of train but I may have just, you know, thought back to a couple ofdays prior or a couple weeks prior or something. I'm not sure --

MR. JENNER: So is there --

MR. BOSTIAN: -- why that would have happened.

MR. JENNER: I'm sorry.

MR. BOSTIAN: I'm not sure why that would have happened. But yes, I think that I subconsciously or whatever may have just hit the wrong speed by mistake, if that makes sense. It's not like I came out of the 65 curve and thought I'm going to go to 70, you know.

But as you approach 70, or as I approached 70, my memory is -- and it could have been from a prior trip. But my memory is that I think I may have, you know, by mistake, accidentally come up to 70 rather than 80.

MR. JENNER: Okay. So you had an opportunity to go faster than you actually did?

MR. BOSTIAN: Right. And so I sped up.


MR. BOSTIAN: And I don't know if I actually, I don't remember if I actually leveled off, for lack of a better word. I don't know if I actually maintained 70 for any particular amount of time or if I just approached and pulled the throttle back and corrected that error before I actually, you know, stabilized at 70 or not.


MR. BOSTIAN: I don't know how long I was there.

MR. JENNER: But sometimes, you just alluded to, if you're operating on a different track or different equipment --


MR. JENNER: -- then 70 would have applied?

MR. BOSTIAN: That's right.



MR. JENNER: Have you operated other equipment on other tracks where you did have to abide by the 70?



MR. BOSTIAN: Yes. I don't know how recently before this trip. But yes, certainly.

MR. JENNER: But is it fair to say more often than not, you would have been allowed to go 80 based on the track and equipment that you're accustomed to operating?

MR. BOSTIAN: I'm not sure what percentage I'd be allowed to go 80 or 70. I certainly often times operated C trains that would be a maximum of 70. And there were several times they had me operate on Track 1 going that direction which would be a maximum of 70 for all trains. Or at least all trains that I regularly operated. But I wouldn't be able to tell you if it was 51 percent of the time.

MR. JENNER: Right.

MR. BOSTIAN: Often would be fair I think.

MR. JENNER: Okay. This incident occurred at night time. Are there any particular challenges working at night in that area of Philadelphia? In terms of visibility, in terms of signals or other queues that you would use to help you operate?

MR. BOSTIAN: I think for the 50 mile an hour curve, it's difficult to see where the curve starts. If you are, or when you do slow down for the 50 mile an hour curve, it's difficult to see where the track physically starts curving.

That being said though, it's clear when you approach it that there is a curve there. Because as you approach that curve, you know there is the SEPTA marker at Frankford El, I think the elevated subway track bridge structure, that gives you a cue that's pretty visible at night.

There's the signals for the interlocking (phonetic). I think it's shore interlocking. It's been almost six months now, I'm a little bit out of the, a little bit rusty on the territory now. But as that track curves to the left, it kind of, you're looking into somewhat of a black abyss.

I mean, it's hard to see where the curve specifically starts but you can tell that there is a curve, if that makes sense.

MR. JENNER: Right.

MR. BOSTIAN: You wouldn't be fooled into thinking the track continued going straight. But as far as trying to peg exactly where the curve starts, it would be easy to hit the curve a little bit hot by five or ten miles an hour if you weren't being careful and looking very carefully at the cues because it can sneak up on you.

But like I said, I mean, you would know there was a curve there if you were looking out the windshield because it's just a black abyss on the other side of the curve.

MR. JENNER: Okay. That's all the questions I have for right now.


MR. JENNER: Dave, you have some follow up?

MR. BUCHER: Just a couple and they're sort of -- this is Dave Bucher. Have you heard or have you had any memories additionally of how the equipment handled? Any issues with the locomotive or the cars?

Initially you told us there was no problems and the train handled as it should.


MR. BUCHER: I guess what I'm looking for, is there anything that you remembered in that department?

MR. BOSTIAN: I don't remember having, I haven't had any memories of any particular mechanical issues. Like I said, other than the window that you guys telling about, with the wind noise from the window.

MR. BUCHER: Okay. And could you go through that a little bit again? You initially told us that there was vibration.

MR. BOSTIAN: I think I said wind noise.

MR. BUCHER: Wind noise? Okay.

MR. BOSTIAN: Or something like that. That is something that I actually remember less well now --


MR. BOSTIAN: -- than I did about six months ago.


MR. BOSTIAN: I just remember that there was noise from, it felt like or it sounded like there was, you know, that the window was cracked open or something. Not that the glass the broken. The glass seemed intact on the side window.


MR. BOSTIAN: But it felt like it didn't close completely or something. And I remember trying to adjust it but I couldn't find a position with the window that would --


MR. BOSTIAN: -- be quiet.

MR. BUCHER: Okay. And those adjustments that you made, did you make those leaving early in the trip or later?

MR. BOSTIAN: Yes. That would have been early. I would have probably tried to adjust that between the area of Washington --


MR. BOSTIAN: -- and Baltimore or something.

MR. BUCHER: Okay. That's all I have right now.


MR. JENNER: Okay. Mary Pat?

MS. MCKAY: So a couple questions.


MS. MCKAY: The first one is going to -- I'll start at the end instead of the beginning.


MS. MCKAY: When you actually got transported to the hospital, who did that transportation for you?

MR. BOSTIAN: To the hospital? I would imagine -- it was in a police paddy wagon. So I imagine it was probably the police that did the driving.

MS. MCKAY: Okay. And there were other passengers in the paddy wagon with you?

MR. BOSTIAN: Yes. I think there was eight seats so probably seven other people.

MS. MCKAY: Okay. And really just out of curiosity and this has very little to do with the question of how the accident came to happen, but comes to some of the questions about how things went after the accident in terms of the emergency medical response. Did they put you in a seatbelt? Do you remember?

MR. BOSTIAN: I'm sorry? Could you --

MS. MCKAY: Was there a seatbelt?

MR. BOSTIAN: In the paddy wagon, there was a strap that you'd hold onto with your hand behind, right around your waist level. But there wasn't a seatbelt that went around your hip.

MS. MCKAY: Okay.

MR. BOSTIAN: And there was a sign. I do remember there were news media reports at the time about being transported in paddy wagons because of other events that had occurred. And so, I did remember hearing about those. And I noticed the straps and I remember pointing them out to other people in the paddy wagon, that they did not notice them.

MS. MCKAY: Okay.

MR. BOSTIAN: And so, I was like, you guys should hold on to these.

MS. MCKAY: Okay. The day sounds, up to this point, from your previous interview, like it was sort of run of the mill kind of a day. Any memories or any symptoms that you might have had? It still sounds like there's some things you don't remember. But do you remember feeling unwell in any way?

MR. BOSTIAN: No, I don't have memories of any symptoms. As far as the -- and I know this is not related to your question. As far as the day being normal, the only abnormal thing about the day -- and I think I covered this last time we spoke, was just that technical issues on the Acela train on the way down to D.C.

MS. MCKAY: Right.

MR. BOSTIAN: With the speed data not available. But as far as your question with the medical symptoms, I don't recall having any sort of abnormal medical symptoms. No cold or anything like that.

MS. MCKAY: Okay. Well that's what I have.

MR. JENNER: Okay. Thank you. I don't have any questions at this moment. But Dave, can you pause that for a moment?

MR. BUCHER: We're going to pause now.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at TIME NOT GIVEN and resumed at TIME


MR. BUCHER: Okay. This is Dave Bucher and we're back on the record. Brandon, if you could -- and I'm just going to follow up on the visibility of the locomotive a little bit.


MR. BUCHER: If you could, tell us what your view, basically describe your view coming in to the accident scene. You know, what, you know, the visibility out the front, visibility to the side, anything that you might be able to add in that respect.

MR. BOSTIAN: Visibility out the front of the engine? It's been a while, it's been six months since I was on it. So I don't have all that clear memory off the top of my head of how the visibility out of the front of the engine was. I don't remember it being an especially big problem but that's not to say that it isn't.

Like I said, I've been away from it for a long time, I would consider right now. So it could have been a factor and I'm not really sure.


MR. BOSTIAN: I do know that visibility to the side can be an issue on that engine.

MR. BUCHER: Okay. All right, that's all I have right now.

MR. JENNER: Just to follow up, what are the issues with the side visibility that you're mentioning?

MR. BOSTIAN: Just that the, looking out the corners, looking kind of to the side and out the corner of the engine can be hard. It can be hard to spot the train accurately at platforms and stuff like that. Or I've never used the locomotive for doing switching operations, but I imagine it might be difficult to see personnel on the ground around the engine.

MR. JENNER: Thank you.

MS. MCKAY: Nothing from me.

MR. JENNER: Great. Just changing pace a bit, if you recall in our first interview, we discussed if you had any thoughts about anything that you can think of that would make the overall railroad industry safer. You've had some time to reflect on this and also, you've had to take care of yourself since then.


MR. JENNER: So I'll make an offer again.

If you have any thoughts about any new procedures, policy, training, equipment that you think would help prevent this type of accident --


MR. JENNER: -- from happening again, we'd like to give you the opportunity to say anything.

MR. BOSTIAN: I think that there are probably things that could be done. I haven't had much time. I've been focusing a lot on recovery over the last few months. And also, it's been, with my condition, it's been difficult to concentrate for very long on things. I'd prefer to wait and go over that at a later time, if that's okay.

MR. JENNER: That would be fine for us.


MR. JENNER: When you're ready, we'd like to hear from you.

MR. BOSTIAN: I appreciate it.

MR. JENNER: Okay. And we'll go around the room, any points of clarification Mr. Goggin?


MR. JENNER: Great. Do you have any thoughts, anything you'd like to share with us Brandon, that we had not discussed that you think would be helpful?

MR. BOSTIAN: I think that about covers it.

I appreciate you guys having another meeting.

MS. MCKAY: Sure.

MR. BUCHER: Not a problem.

MR. JENNER: Well we appreciate you being here and your willingness to talk to us a second time.

The time is 11: 30 and --

MR. GOGGIN: Just for purposes of finishing up -- this is Mr. Goggin. If it would be helpful to you in any way, we'd be happy to talk to you a third, a fourth, a fifth, anything you want.

MR. BUCHER: Great. We appreciate that.


MR. BUCHER: Thank you.

MR. JENNER: So with that, we'll finish up this interview.

MR. BUCHER: Okay. That concludes the interview.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 11:30 a.m.)